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QUANTIFYING THE TIGHTNESS OF 
MORTGAGE CREDIT AND ASSESSING 
POLICY ACTIONS 
LAURIE S. GOODMAN* 
Abstract: This Article quantifies the dramatic tightening of mortgage credit 
that has occurred in the post-crisis period. It then describes the policy actions 
to loosen the credit box taken to date by both the government sponsored en-
terprises (GSEs) and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), as well as those taken by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
concluding the FHA still has some important actions it has yet to undertake. 
Finally, the consequences of tight credit are discussed: namely, a lower home 
ownership rate, particularly among minorities, leaving many unable to access 
what has historically been the single most powerful vehicle to build wealth. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mortgage credit has become very tight in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. Although experts generally agree that it is poor public policy to make 
loans to borrowers who cannot make their payments, failing to make mort-
gages to those who can make their payments has an opportunity cost, be-
cause historically homeownership has been the best way to build wealth. 
And, default is not binary: very few borrowers will default under all cir-
cumstances, and very few borrowers will never default. The decision where 
to draw the line—which mortgages to make—comes down to what proba-
bility of default we as a society are prepared to tolerate. 
This Article first quantifies the tightness of mortgage credit in histori-
cal perspective. It then discusses one consequence of tight credit: fewer 
mortgage loans are being made. The Article then evaluates the policy ac-
tions to loosen the credit box taken by the government-sponsored enterpris-
es (GSEs) and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), as well as the policy actions taken by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA), arguing that the GSEs have been much more successful 
than the FHA. The Article concludes with the argument that if we don’t 
solve mortgage credit availability issues, we will have a much lower per-
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centage of homeowners because a larger share of potential new homebuyers 
will likely be Hispanic or nonwhite—groups that have historically had low-
er incomes, less wealth, and lower credit scores than whites. Because 
homeownership has traditionally been the best way for households to build 
wealth, the inability of these new potential homeowners to buy could in-
crease economic inequality between whites and nonwhites. 
I. QUANTIFYING THE TIGHTNESS OF MORTGAGE CREDIT 
 Before we can discuss whether mortgage credit is tight or loose, we 
must be able to measure it objectively. Many researchers have looked at the 
Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey,1 while others use the 
mortgage denial rate as measured by Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data. Neither source seems very useful for our purposes. The Fed-
eral Reserve survey failed to pick up the loosening of credit in 2000 to 
2007, although it did pick up recent tightening (Figure 1a). The denial rate 
using HMDA data is even less useful; it was highest in 2007, suggesting 
credit was tightest then, when we know that was when it was loosest (Fig-
ure 1b). Denial rates confuse supply and demand. Although the supply of 
mortgage credit was very robust in 2007, the demand from marginal bor-
rowers was even greater, leading to a high denial rate in the face of loose 
credit. 
We can look directly at the mortgages originated at any point in time to 
quantify the tightness of mortgage credit. However, many different dimen-
sions make up credit risk. The most important dimensions include the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio, debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, credit score (FICO is the 
measure traditionally used for mortgages), and whether the mortgage is a 
traditional product (fixed-rate mortgage with a term of 30 or fewer years, or 
an adjustable-rate mortgage with more than 5 years to the reset) or a non-
traditional product (interest-only loan, loan with negative amortization, 40-
year mortgage, or hybrid adjustable-rate loan with a short fixed-rate period 
where the payment is initially low and rises considerably over the life of the 
mortgage). In 2016, mortgage credit looked very tight when measured by 
FICO scores and percentage of nontraditional products; it looked much 
looser when measured by LTV ratios and about average when measured by 
DTI ratios (Figure 2). 
So which measure should we be relying on? Li and Goodman (2014, 
8–18) constructed a Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) that is up-
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dated quarterly.2 The HCAI measures the ex ante credit risk of the mortgag-
es originated in any given quarter—more precisely, it measures the likeli-
hood that those mortgages ever default, which is defined as ever going 90 or 
more days delinquent. The index is constructed by first examining the be-
havior of 2001–2002 mortgages, which represent a normal scenario, and 
2005–2006 mortgages, which represent a stress scenario. Look-up tables are 
constructed for the two groups of mortgages, showing the percentage of 
loans that defaulted as a function of LTV, DTI, FICO, and whether the loan 
is a nontraditional product. Mortgages for any quarter are then mapped into 
the look-up tables, with the results for 2001–2002 production (the normal 
scenario) weighted by 90%, and the results for 2005–2006 production (the 
stress scenario) weighted by 10%.3 The results of this analysis are shown in 
Figure 3, which tracks the HCAI from 1998 through the first half of 2016. 
The top line shows the total risk of the market, as measured by the ex ante 
probability of default. The borrower risk measures the risk of the market 
using actual borrower characteristics for each origination quarter but as-
sumes there are no nontraditional products. 
This analysis produces a few key takeaways: 
• While total risk increased considerably from 2001 to 2007, borrower 
risk increased only slightly. The increase in total risk reflected the large 
uptick in the availability of nontraditional, more risky products. Bor-
rowers with the same risk profiles were taking larger loans in 2005 to 
2007 than they were earlier in the decade. They were able to qualify 
because the payments were artificially lowered by various features, in-
cluding paying back interest only (no pay-down of principal), negative 
amortization, 40-year amortization schedules, and low initial payments 
that reset upward after a short period (2/28 and 3/27 mortgages). In 
2001, total risk averaged 12.3%, with borrower risk at 9.3%. By 2006, 
total risk averaged 16.5%, with borrower risk having increased only 
marginally to 10.5%. 
• As of second quarter (Q2) 2016, the market was taking less than half 
the credit risk it was taking in 2001, a period of reasonable lending 
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standards. In 2001, the ex ante probability of default was 12.3%; as of 
Q2 2016, it was 5.1%. 
Moreover, using historical experience is misleading, and the market is tak-
ing even less credit risk than is indicated by the HCAI. We make this argu-
ment because for every given risk category, mortgages with similar charac-
teristics are performing better than they have in the past at the same age. 
Figure 4 shows the experience of Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) fully amortizing mortgages with FICO scores below 700, 
80% to 90% loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, and full documentation. These 
loans are tracking much better at the same age than the best performing 
mortgages for which we have data—the 1999–2003 vintages—and much 
better than the 2004–2010 vintages. (Goodman 2016). And this FICO-LTV 
bucket is not an isolated example. No matter what cohort we look at, we 
find a similar pattern: recent mortgages are performing much better at the 
same age than the 1999–2003 cohort. 
II. HOW MANY LOANS ARE MISSING AS A RESULT OF TIGHT CREDIT? 
What are the consequences of tight credit? Many loans are not being 
made that should be. This change can be seen in Figure 5, which compares 
the number of home sales (new and existing) with the number of mortgages 
extended, every year from 2001 through 2015. In 2001, new and existing 
home sales totaled 5.785 million units; in 2015, sales totaled 5.564 million 
units, a 4% drop. However, the number of mortgages is down far more dra-
matically, a drop from 4.651 million units to 3.513 million units, a 32% 
drop. Stated differently, over this period, the number of new and existing 
home sales was down 4%, while the number of mortgages was down 32%. 
We established earlier that credit is very tight. One way to measure the 
consequences of this tightness is to analyze the changing distribution of 
credit scores among loans being originated. HMDA, our most complete 
record of originations, does not yet contain credit scores. However, HMDA 
data can be matched with CoreLogic data, which does contain credit scores, 
following the methodology detailed in Li and colleagues. (Li et al. 2014, vi, 
21–31). Later years of CoreLogic data do not include many of the nonbank 
originators or servicers, so beginning in 2012, we supplement these data 
with agency data from (eMBS). (eMBS Inc). These matched/supplemented 
results are used for the balance of this section of this Article. The most re-
cent available HMDA data are from 2015. 
Figure 6 shows borrowers grouped by FICO score range (above 700, 
660 to 700, below 660) through time. In 2001, more than 30% of borrowers 
had FICOs below 660. By 2015, that share had dropped to around 14%. 
Thus, low-credit-score borrowers make up a shrinking share of a shrinking 
2017] Policy Responses to the Tightness of Mortgage Credit 239 
bucket (as the total number of mortgages originated has dropped dramati-
cally). 
Goodman, Zhu, and Bai calculated the number of “missing loans” us-
ing the HMDA-CoreLogic matched data, supplemented with agency data 
from eMBS, and then scaled up to the HMDA universe. (Goodman, Zhu & 
Bai 2016). Table 1 shows their results. The “actual decline” column shows 
the decline in the absolute number of mortgages made to each FICO group. 
The number of loans to borrowers with FICOs above 700 is down 1.4%, the 
number of loans to borrowers with FICOs of 660 to 700 is down 20.3%, and 
the number of loans to borrowers with FICOs below 660 is down a shock-
ing 64.9%. 
Assuming loans in each FICO bucket had been down the same 1.4% as 
loans to borrowers with FICOs above 700, how many additional loans 
would there have been? The answer, contained in the final column, is there 
would have been an additional 1.1 million loans in 2015: approximately 
163,000 additional loans to borrowers with FICOs of 660 to 700 and 
911,000 additional loans to borrowers with FICOs below 660. 
Cumulatively, from 2009 to 2015, using this methodology, Goodman, 
Zhu, and Bai found 6.3 million missing loans. (Goodman, Zhu & Bai 2016). 
This number is likely an overstatement because it conflates supply and de-
mand. Perhaps in the wake of the financial crises, lower-credit-score bor-
rowers, many having seen friends and relatives lose their homes to foreclo-
sure, have less desire to take a mortgage to own their own home. Although 
it is unclear how to sort out these supply and demand effects, no one can 
rationally look at a 65% drop in mortgages to borrowers with low credit 
scores and not believe that there would be many more loans if credit were 
not so tight. 
III. WHY IS CREDIT SO TIGHT? 
Credit is very tight in large part because originators are putting credit 
overlays on top of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie 
Mae”), Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) underwriting box. That is, Fannie 
Mae may be willing to underwrite a mortgage with a 620 FICO, but the 
originator requires a 660 FICO. 
Why would originators knowingly drive away business? Because they 
are concerned that the costs of producing and servicing mortgages that are 
less pristine are higher than what they can earn on the mortgages. There are 
three sources of these concerns: representations and warranties, also called 
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“reps and warrants risk”4; litigation risk, particularly the use of the False 
Claims Act (the “Act”); and the high and uncertain costs of servicing delin-
quent loans. 
A. Reps and Warrants Risk 
Originators fear that if a loan they have extended defaults, the insurer 
or guarantor will carefully scrutinize the original loan documentation, find 
some small item in violation of insurer or guarantor guidelines, and force 
the originator to repurchase the loan or refuse to honor the insurance on the 
loan. For loans of 80% loan-to-value (LTV) or less sold to the government 
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the put-back enforcement is determined by 
the GSEs’ policies. By charter, however, the GSEs cannot take the first loss 
risk on loans greater than 80% LTV; these loans require additional credit 
enhancement. Stated differently, another entity must take the loss on mort-
gage amounts greater than 80% LTV. Mortgage insurance is the vehicle 
usually chosen. Thus, loans greater than 80% LTV that are sold to the GSEs 
have an added level of rep and warrant exposure to the mortgage insurers. 
When there is any type of rep and warrant violation, the mortgage insurers 
can and historically have rescinded the insurance. That is, they will refund 
all paid premiums and effectively take the position that the insurance policy 
never existed. And, when the mortgage insurer rescinds coverage, the GSEs 
have historically put the loan back to the lender automatically. FHA loans 
are similarly subject to the FHA refusing to honor the insurance or demand-
ing indemnification for any claim filed. 
Figure 7 shows the share of full-documentation fully amortizing 30-
year Fannie Mae loans that were put back, by origination year. The numbers 
are not high. Even for the peak year, 2007, only around 2% of these loans 
were repurchased. As shown in Housing Finance Policy Center (2016, 38), 
Freddie Mac put-back numbers are very similar to the Fannie Mae numbers. 
However, the repurchases are much higher for less than full documen-
tation loans, Alt-A loans, interest-only loans, 40-year loans, and others. And 
the numbers in Figure 7 do not account for loans covered under global set-
tlements because these were not loan-level put-backs. But the loans with 
high put-back rates are no longer being made by originators or purchased by 
the GSEs. For the types of loans being made now, the put-back numbers are 
extraordinarily low, but the scars are very deep. 
                                                                                                                           
4 At the inception of the loan, the originator presents facts about the loans that the guarantor or 
insurer rely on (representations) and provides an assurance these facts are true, with an implied 
indemnification obligation (warranties). To the extent these representations are untrue, the origina-
tor runs the risk that the he will be required by the guarantor or insurer to repurchase the loan. 
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So how do lenders protect themselves? First, they try to make loans 
that are very unlikely to default. Hence the reason our HCAI is so low. Sec-
ond, lenders are spending an inordinate amount of time on each loan to 
make sure the loans are error free. Figure 8 shows the number of loans un-
derwritten per retail originator per month. These data, provided by the 
Mortgage Bankers Association (Mortgage Bankers Association 2016, 12–
21), show the number of underwritten applications has gone from around 
180 loans per month per underwriter in 2002 to around 34 per month in 
2015. Assuming twenty-one working days in each month, an originator is 
now spending about five hours with each loan, up sharply from one hour 
per loan in 2001. 
1. GSE Actions on Reps and Warrants 
Errors made in the origination of the loan are called “manufacturing 
defects” and logically should be avoidable by the originator. A loan that is 
manufactured error free may still default for reasons beyond the control of 
the originator (such as the borrower’s subsequent unemployment), and that 
risk of default is why originators seek insurance from the secondary market. 
The GSEs and the FHA have acted to make originators and servicers com-
fortable that they are responsible only for manufacturing defects on the 
loans, but not for subsequent performance. The GSEs, and the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), have far more flexibility than the FHA to 
address lenders’ concerns. For executive branch departments such as the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), of which 
FHA is a part, significant changes in rules must be made in accordance with 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s rules for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing and listed in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which together 
create a complex and time-consuming set of process requirements. (Carey 
2013, 5–6). More problematically, however, any clarification of the FHA 
enforcement regime requires the cooperation of other executive branch de-
partments, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, which have shared re-
sponsibility for enforcing FHA rules. Enforcement agencies often prefer to 
maintain wide discretion in how they interpret rules, which often creates 
uncertainty for lenders, a challenge that we discuss later in this section. As a 
result, the GSEs have made much more progress addressing reps and war-
rants issues than has the FHA. 
The GSEs began to act on reps and warrants issues in September 2012, 
and have now substantially completed their new reps and warrants frame-
work. That framework includes six features: (1) rep and warrant sunsets; (2) 
clarification of life-of-loan exclusions; (3) no further put-backs on pre-2009 
loans; (4) loan review earlier in the process; (5) a taxonomy of loan defects 
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with remedies; and, (6) an independent dispute resolution process. Moreo-
ver, the GSEs are moving toward waiving many representations and war-
ranties at the point of origination (Day 1 Certainty). Fannie did so in the 
fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016 for mortgages meeting specific criteria, and 
Freddie Mac expects to release a similar program in calendar year 2017. 
(Caruso 2016). 
Between 2012 and 2016, the FHFA and GSEs took the following ac-
tions on reps and warrants, which are summarized as a timeline in Figure 9: 
• In September 2012, the GSEs and the FHFA, then under the leadership 
of Acting Director Edward DeMarco, introduced a 36-month sunset—
that is, if the loan had a clean pay history for the first three years, the 
originator would no longer be responsible for the rep and warrant risk. 
(Federal Housing Finance Agency 2012). The sunset was 12 months 
for loans modified under the Home Affordable Refinancing Program. 
In May 2014, in one of Director Mel Watt’s first actions, the FHFA re-
laxed the sunset eligibility requirements to allow loans with no more 
than two 30-day delinquencies and no 60-day delinquencies during the 
applicable 36- or 12-month period to qualify. (Fannie Mae 2014a, 2–3; 
Freddie Mac 2014b, 2–3). 
• The FHFA wanted to comfort lenders that they were responsible only 
for manufacturing defects, not subsequent performance. However, the 
sunsets did not give lenders sufficient comfort because the GSEs re-
tained certain life-of-loan exclusions that never sunset, including: (1) 
misrepresentation, misstatements, or omissions; (2) data inaccuracies; 
(3) charter compliance issues; (4) first-lien enforceability or clear title 
matters; (5) legal compliance violations; and (6) unacceptable mort-
gage products. In November 2014, the FHFA clarified these life-of-
loan exclusions in detail, requiring a pattern of misbehavior, not isolat-
ed instances, to trigger put-backs. (Fannie Mae 2014b, 2–3; Freddie 
Mac 2014a, 2). The first two exclusions received the most attention, as 
they were of most concern to originators. A misstatement, for example, 
must involve at least three loans delivered to the GSE by the same 
lender and be made pursuant to a common activity involving the same 
individual or entity to be “significant.”5 
• In October 2013, the FHFA announced that the GSEs needed to file rep 
and warrant claims on loans originated in 2009 and earlier by the end 
of 2013. (DeMarco 2013). Thus, lenders could be certain that they will 
not be subject to further put-backs on these loans. The thought was that 
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if the management of legacy lenders was not distracted with old issues, 
it would be able to originate more new loans. 
• In September 2012, the FHFA announced the GSEs would review a 
sample of loans shortly after purchase in order to provide feedback to 
lenders earlier in the process on specific loans and on what the GSEs 
expect systemically. Using a combination of random and targeted sam-
ples, the GSEs review loan files in the first four months after purchase 
to ensure they meet underwriting eligibility requirements. (Federal 
Housing Finance Agency 2012). Thus, lenders better understand the 
GSEs’ expectations and are more likely to be able to meet them. 
• In October 2015, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac implemented a taxon-
omy under which loan defects are graded. In the least serious category, 
a data change may be required, but the loan would have been pur-
chased anyway at the same price, so no further adjustment is necessary. 
(Fannie Mae 2015a, 3; Freddie Mac 2015a, 3). In the second category, 
where the defect makes the loan riskier, a loan-level price adjustment 
may be required. Only loans in the third category, those with signifi-
cant defects, will be subject to put-back. Moreover, if mortgage insur-
ance is rescinded, a loan is no longer considered an automatic put 
back; other remediation is possible. 
• In February 2016, the GSEs concluded their rep and warrant frame-
work by implementing an independent dispute resolution process. 
(Fannie Mae 2016a; Freddie Mac 2016a, 1–2). Before this, the GSEs 
would revisit a put-back loan if the lender objected, but they retained 
the final decision power. 
• Finally, late in 2016, Fannie Mae rolled out its Day 1 Certainty pro-
gram, in which certain representations and warranties for qualifying 
mortgages are waived at the point of origination. (Fannie Mae 2016a). 
In particular, Fannie will waive income, assets, and employment repre-
sentations when it can automatically verify these at the point of origi-
nation. It will also waive the rep and warrant for appraisals when the 
value of the property is sufficiently close to Fannie Mae’s automated 
valuation. Finally, Fannie Mae will waive the property inspection re-
quirement on refinance transactions; the lender will receive rep and 
warrant relief on property value, condition, and marketability. Freddie 
Mac expects to release a similar program in calendar year 2017. 
In addition to the development of their rep and warrant framework, the 
GSEs have taken steps to increase credit to low- and moderate-income bor-
rowers. They reintroduced 97% LTV lending in December 2014. (Swanson 
2014). In August 2015, Fannie Mae introduced the HomeReady program, 
which, for the first time, takes account of the income of household members 
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not on the mortgage. Both GSEs are working with lenders to expand their 
97% LTV programs, which are targeted to low- and moderate-income bor-
rowers. (Mortgage Reports Newsdesk 2016). 
2. FHA Actions on Put-Back Risk and the False Claims Act 
The FHA has made much less progress than the GSEs in giving lend-
ers certainty that they will be responsible only for manufacturing defects. 
Moreover, the FHA is a more important vehicle for low- and moderate-
income borrowers than the GSEs; the GSEs and private mortgage insurers 
do risk-based pricing, while the FHA does not. Thus, the FHA has more 
favorable pricing for most high-LTV lending; and, within this sphere, the 
more risky the borrower characteristics, the larger the FHA pricing ad-
vantage. 
On the positive side, the FHA has taken three important actions, which 
it initially outlined in its Blueprint for Access.6 (FHA 2014). These FHA 
actions are summarized as a timeline in Figure 10. First, the FHA made it 
easier to utilize its more than 900 mortgagee letters, which are used to 
communicate with lenders. In September 2015, the FHA completed the 
Herculean task of putting all the letters in a single, coordinated document; 
in the process, the administration eliminated inconsistent information. 
Second, the FHA created a supplemental performance metric to meas-
ure lender risk-taking. FHA lenders are subject to a compare ratio, which 
evaluates early pay default rates across lenders. When a lender’s compare 
ratio is more than twice the industry average, the FHA can terminate that 
lender’s ability to issue FHA loans; before this happens, warehouse lenders 
would have pulled the lender’s funding lines. But lenders that originate a 
greater proportion of loans to more risky borrowers—borrowers the FHA is 
often interested in serving—are likely to have higher compare ratios. The 
supplemental performance metric, introduced in August 2015, corrects for 
the riskiness of the lender’s book of business. If the lender triggers the 
compare ratio, but not the supplemental performance metric, the FHA has 
guaranteed it will take no action. (FHA Office of Single Family Housing 
2015b). 
Third, in June 2015 the FHA completed a loan quality assessment tax-
onomy that classified manufacturing defects into four categories: (1) loans 
that would have been made anyway if the correct values were used; (2) 
loans that would have been unapprovable by a small margin; (3) loans that 
would have been unapprovable by a large margin; and (4) loans with fraud, 
material misrepresentations, inconsistent information, or containing a statu-
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tory violation. (FHA Office of Single Family Housing 2015a, 7). Unfortu-
nately, the taxonomy does not define the remedy for loans in each category, 
which effectively means that the taxonomy has not been implemented. 
The FHA did take one very important additional action to expand ac-
cess, lowering its annual insurance premiums in January 2015. This price 
reduction was intended to make mortgage lending more affordable to low- 
and moderate-income borrowers, who make up the bulk of FHA customers. 
The expected increase in volume was expected to partially compensate for 
the decrease in profitability per loan. 
B. Litigation Risk from the False Claims Act 
The big issue for FHA servicers is the presence of the False Claims 
Act. This Act allows the federal government to recoup damages from peo-
ple or entities that knowingly submit false or fraudulent claims for payment 
or approval. The liability under this Act is extensive: violators are required 
to pay civil penalties and, much more critically, a fine equal to triple the 
loss amount. (31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)). The FHA’s direct endorsement pro-
gram grants qualified lenders the right to deem mortgages eligible for FHA 
insurance. As part of this delegation, lenders are required to certify annually 
that their quality control mechanisms comply with all relevant HUD rules. 
They must also certify that each loan complies with all eligible HUD rules. 
The HUD inspector general periodically audits loans that go to claim. If 
loan-level certification or the annual certification is found to be incorrect, 
the case is referred to the Department of Justice, which can sue under the 
False Claims Act. (Goodman 2015, 2). 
Table 2 lists the firms that have settled with the Department of Justice 
when faced with False Claims Act violations. It includes most of the largest 
lenders, and fines total close to $5 billion. Quicken is the only firm continu-
ing to fight the allegations and fine. 
The actions under the False Claims Act have had an absolutely chilling 
effect on lenders’ willingness to originate mortgages that have more than a 
trivial probability of default. (Goodman 2015, 1–2). This chill has kept the 
FHA lending box far tighter than the FHA’s stated requirements. Many of 
the largest banks that have settled with the Department of Justice have tried 
to move out of FHA lending, instead setting up programs for 97% LTV 
conventional mortgages with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 
There are two solutions to the False Claims Act threat. First, the FHA 
could establish a certification that protects the FHA and makes the lenders 
comfortable—a very tricky balancing act. The FHA has revised the certifi-
cation several times, but the servicers have not been convinced they are safe 
from False Claims Act liability for insignificant defects. Second, and better, 
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the FHA could complete its loan quality assessment taxonomy and, in con-
junction with the Department of Justice, establish a policy that allows only 
the most serious category of errors or the most serious two categories of 
errors to be subject to False Claims Act charges. 
C. High and Uncertain Servicing Costs 
The high and variable cost of servicing delinquent loans is an unappre-
ciated constraint on access to credit. (Goodman 2014, 1–4). Numbers ob-
tained from the Mortgage Bankers Association show the annual cost of ser-
vicing performing loans in 2015 was $181, while the annual cost of servic-
ing nonperforming loans was $2,386 (Figure 11). The cost of servicing 
nonperforming loans has also risen far more steeply than the cost of servic-
ing performing loans. Lenders can price for cost, but cost variability due to 
such factors as how easy it would be to transfer servicing if the lender need-
ed to do so is impossible to price for. And, many lenders believe they are 
getting mixed signals from the government; the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau (CFPB) is telling them to do whatever they can to keep delin-
quent borrowers in their homes, while the GSEs and FHA impose fines 
(compensatory fees) on servicers that exceed specified timelines. This high 
and variable cost of servicing nonperforming loans is leading many lenders 
to decide they are unwilling to make loans that have any nontrivial proba-
bility of default. 
Further, the number of months a loan is delinquent at the time it is 
foreclosed on and becomes real estate owned (REO) has been rising sharp-
ly. At the end of 2008, the average mortgage was 18 months delinquent at 
real estate owned (REO) liquidation; by late 2014, the average mortgage 
was 34 months delinquent at REO liquidation. (Cordell & Lambie-Hanson 
2015, 19). The dramatic extension stems from more loans being left in the 
pipeline in states with judicial foreclosure regimes (the nonjudicial states 
have cleared their pipelines). Between 2008 and late 2014, the share of 
REO liquidations in judicial states increased from 25% to 50%, and the 
number of months delinquent at the time of liquidation roughly doubled 
from 21 to 43. (Id.). 
1. GSE Servicing Issues: Compensatory Fees Reduced Considerably 
Both GSEs have made great strides to give servicers comfort that if 
they service within the context of the market they will not be charged 
“compensatory fees” (meant to compensate the GSEs for lost interest) for 
foreclosure delays. Before November 2014, the state-by-state foreclosure 
completion timelines imposed by the GSEs were so tight that two of every 
three loans that went through foreclosure would be flagged as over the al-
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lowable time limit. Although a servicer is not responsible for “uncontrolla-
ble delays,” once a loan is flagged, the servicer must establish the extent of 
such delays loan by loan, a cumbersome process with an uncertain outcome. 
In November 2014, the FHFA and the GSEs announced a number of 
changes, effective January 1, 2015, to reduce the burden associated with the 
compensatory fees. (Fannie Mae 2014c, 1–2; Freddie Mac 2014c, 1–2). 
First, the timelines in 47 states were recalibrated so only 40% of loans in 
the foreclosure process exceeded the target. The FHFA and the GSEs also 
increased the threshold for imposing compensatory fees from $1,000 to 
$25,000 in total fees a month. As a result, close to half the servicers do not 
have to pay compensatory fees at all; for those that do, the amounts are 
smaller and less variable. In September 2015, the GSEs announced an ex-
tension of the timeline in thirty-three states; the GSEs made a small round 
of changes in March 2016, in which timelines were cut in some states and 
extended in others. (Fannie Mae 2015b, 2; Fannie Mae 2016c, 2; Freddie 
Mac 2015b, 1–2; Freddie Mac 2016b, 3). 
In late 2015, the GSEs also adopted a defect taxonomy for servicing. 
(Fannie Mae 2015c, 1–2; Freddie Mac 2015c, 5). This defect taxonomy 
grades servicing deficiencies and attaches a remediation to each violation, 
reassuring servicers that a delinquent loan will not be put back because of 
minor servicing violations. 
2. FHA Servicing Issues 
Servicing FHA loans is more costly than servicing GSE loans; in re-
sponse to our questioning, a number of lenders have estimated that non-
reimbursable costs and direct expenses associated with FHA’s foreclosure 
and conveyance policies were more than double that for GSE loans. These 
higher costs reduce lenders’ profit on loans that go delinquent, and thus 
their willingness to make loans that they may have to manage through de-
linquency. 
Servicers’ issues with FHA servicing (Goodman 2014, 3) can be loose-
ly grouped into two categories: timeline-related concerns and problematic 
conveyance and property preservation standards. Some of these issues were 
corrected early in 2016, but much still remains to be done. 
The first set of issues associated with FHA servicing arises because 
FHA timelines are over-engineered and inflexible. Unlike the GSEs, which 
set one timeline for the delinquency or foreclosure process, the FHA has 
separate timelines for each phase, set state by state. There is a set amount of 
time from the first missed payment to the first legal deadline by which the 
lender must begin foreclosure proceedings, there is a separate timeline from 
the first legal action date to completion of the foreclosure process, and an-
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other timeline from completion of the foreclosure process to conveyance. If 
any of these steps run over, the servicer is subject to monetary fines. Lend-
ers cannot make up time lost in one part of the process by being more effi-
cient in another. 
From January 2013, when the CFPB issued its servicing standards 
(Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 2013, 380–381, 452), to Febru-
ary 2015, when the FHA issued Mortgagee Letter 2016-4, the FHA’s first 
legal deadline—the requirement that FHA servicers must initiate foreclo-
sure actions within 180 days of default—was often inconsistent with the 
CFPB timelines, which provide that foreclosure cannot be initiated until the 
borrower is 120 days or more delinquent. Lenders were likely to miss the 
FHA’s deadline on borrowers who submitted modification information just 
before the CFPB deadline because there was insufficient time for the lender 
to review the information, decline to offer a modification, and give the bor-
rower time to appeal. FHA Mortgagee Letter 2016-4 allows for automatic 
extensions when there is an inconsistency with CFPB rules. Although this 
has helped with the specific problem of the first legal deadline, it does not 
correct the broader problem of insufficient flexibility throughout the pro-
cess. 
The second set of FHA servicing issues concerns the vague, problem-
atic conveyance and property presentation standards and processes. The 
conveyance process for FHA differs from that of any other governmental 
entity. The GSEs and the Veterans Administration require servicers to con-
vey title to properties within twenty-four hours of a foreclosure sale. By 
contrast, the FHA requires servicers to convey the property within thirty 
days of a foreclosure sale or the receipt of marketable title, and to complete 
repairs before conveyance to ensure the property is in “conveyable condi-
tion.” The difference in treatment arises because the FHA guarantees the 
loan, which is technically owned by the lender, and only the owner of the 
mortgage (the lender) can foreclose. In contrast, the GSEs own the loans, 
and they can direct the lender to foreclose. Moreover, the FHA holds the 
servicer responsible for maintaining the property until the claim is paid by 
HUD, rather than transferring responsibility for maintenance when title is 
conveyed. 
As a result of these differences, FHA lenders absorb some uncertain-
ties of the foreclosure process, and the FHA sets strict limits on reimburse-
ments. This tension has generated the following issues for servicers: 
• The definition of “conveyable condition” was unclear. FHA clarified 
this definition in Mortgagee Letter 2016-02, issued in February 2016. 
However, before the property can be conveyed, FHA requires an in-
spection, which takes time to arrange. While waiting for inspection, the 
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home is often vandalized. Moreover, the damage caused by vandalism 
is not usually reimbursable to the lender; if the damage was not ade-
quately noted on the initial inspection report, HUD does not reimburse 
the lender. 
• The allowance for repairs is too low and restrictive. This was im-
proved, but not completely corrected, in Mortgagee Letter 2016-02. 
For example, there was a $2,500 maximum property preservation al-
lowance before February 2016 that was raised to $5,000, and there are 
limits on individual repairs ($1,000 for a roof repair, for instance). A 
servicer can exceed these limits but must seek approval in advance. A 
related issue is that the FHA requires the property to be conveyed va-
cant. FHA borrowers often require a forced eviction—which frequent-
ly results in additional property damage—because the relocation incen-
tives are insufficient to encourage borrowers to move voluntarily. 
• Responsibility for the property after conveyance increases uncertainty. 
Between conveyance and when HUD makes the final payment, the 
property can be subject to continued deterioration and vandalism. This 
increases the servicer’s costs as well as liability; the extent of that in-
crease is not under the servicer’s control, nor is it reimbursable. 
Moreover, according to the FHA’s Single Family Loan Performance Trends 
reports, the time from foreclosure (deed transfer) to HUD acquisition has 
increased dramatically from 5.7 months in February 2013 to 12 months in 
August 2016. (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2016, 
6; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2013, 6). This ex-
tension is costly to servicers, as the home must be maintained during this 
period. 
D. Bottom Line 
The GSEs have substantially reduced lender overlays on their credit 
box. They have introduced a new rep and warrant framework and have 
made necessary servicing reforms. Although the FHA has made some pro-
gress, the False Claims Act litigation looms as a large issue for servicers. 
Moreover, FHA servicing procedures continue to be much more problemat-
ic than GSE servicing. 
The inability of the FHA to match the GSEs’ progress has a particular 
impact on access to mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income borrow-
ers, most of whom cannot put down a large down payment. Since the cut in 
the FHA mortgage insurance premium in January 2015, most borrowers 
with an LTV greater than 95% and a FICO score below 760 will find pric-
ing on an FHA loan more favorable than on a GSE loan (Housing Finance 
Policy Center 2016, 33), but such borrowers may not be able to get FHA 
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loans. Until the FHA resolves the issues causing lender overlays, it is hard 
to see how the credit box can open considerably for such borrowers. 
IV. TIGHT MORTGAGE CREDIT HITS MINORITY BORROWERS HARDER THAN 
NON-HISPANIC WHITE BORROWERS 
The differences in homeownership rates between non-Hispanic white 
households and Hispanic, African American, and other nonwhite house-
holds are dramatic. In the 2010 Census, for instance, the homeownership 
rate was 72.2% for white families, 47.3% for Hispanic families, 44.3% for 
African American families, and 56.3% for families of other races and eth-
nicities. (Goodman, Pendall & Zhu 2015, 40). Much of this disparity re-
flects large differences in median income; white households had a median 
income of $55,800 in 2010, while Hispanic or nonwhite households had a 
median income of $33,600. The difference in wealth is even larger; median 
wealth is $140,000 for non-Hispanic white families versus $22,000 for His-
panic or nonwhite families. (Bricker et al. 2014, 11–12). 
These differences are especially important to the country and the econ-
omy because new potential homeowners are going to be increasingly minor-
ity. Goodman, Pendall and Zhu (2015, 26–27) have estimated that of the 
11.6 million new households expected to form between 2010 and 2020, 
77% will be Hispanic or nonwhite. This number rises to 88% between 2020 
and 2030. Although Goodman, Pendall, and Zhu expect the homeownership 
rate to continue declining, the new homeowners will be disproportionately 
Hispanic or nonwhite. As shown in Figure 12, they estimate that between 
2010 and 2020, 84% of the net new homebuyers will be Hispanic or 
nonwhite: 47% Hispanic, 10% African American, and 26% other (primarily 
Asian). They expect this number to rise to slightly above 100% between 
2020 and 2030, because more non-Hispanic whites, the oldest segment of 
the population, are exiting homeownership than are entering it. That is, the 
share of new non-Hispanic white homeowners is expected to decline as that 
population ages, with Hispanics accounting for 56% of all net new home-
owners, African Americans accounting for 11%, and those of other races 
accounting for 33%. 
Given that the composition of new homeowners is skewed to Hispan-
ics and nonwhites, who have lower credit scores (Avery, Brevoort & Canner 
2010, 18–19) or are credit invisible (Brevoort, Grimm & Kambara 2015, 
16–18), and have less income and less wealth than their non-Hispanic white 
counterparts (Bricker et al. 2014, 4), the tight credit box will inhibit home-
ownership even more going forward than it has in the past, unless we do 
something to correct it. 
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V. TIGHT MORTGAGE CREDIT MEANS FEWER HOUSEHOLDS HAVE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD WEALTH, EXACERBATING ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 
We showed earlier that one consequence of tight credit is that fewer 
loans are made. This means fewer households will have the opportunity to 
become homeowners, and homeownership has historically been the best 
way to build wealth. The Federal Reserve’s 2013 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances shows this pattern very dramatically, as tabulated by the Joint Center 
for Housing Studies. (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2015, appendix table 
W-2). The total median net worth for homeowners is $195,500, of which 
$80,000 comes from home equity, the single largest component of net 
worth. In contrast, the total median net worth for renter households is 
$5,400. (Id.). 
This pattern, in which homeowners have a considerably higher net 
worth than renters and their home is the single largest component of this net 
worth, holds across all races and ethnicities. Among white households, the 
median household net worth for homeowners is $231,100 (including 
$90,000 in home equity); the median net worth for renters is $8,201. 
Among African American households, the median net worth of homeowners 
is $79,970 (including $47,000 in home equity); the median net worth of 
renters is $1,100. Among Hispanic households, the median net worth of 
homeowners is $90,250 (including $48,000 in home equity); renters have a 
median net worth of $5,070. (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2015, 15). 
These results clearly indicate that homeownership is a path to wealth build-
ing. 
Moreover, primary residences are distributed far more equitably than 
other assets. The top 10% of households (as ranked by housing wealth) hold 
46% of the country’s net housing wealth, the top 20% hold 63%, and the top 
50% hold 90%. (Li & Goodman 2016, 37). Compare this to the concentra-
tion of household wealth, in which the top 3% of households hold 54% of 
the total wealth, and the top 10% hold 75% of the total wealth. (Bricker et 
al. 2014, 10). 
Tight credit means that in the future, fewer households will have the 
opportunity to build wealth by owning their home, contributing to growing 
economic inequality. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the financial crises, mortgage credit has become extraordinarily 
tight. The Housing Credit Availability Index indicates mortgage lenders are 
taking less than half the credit risk they were taking in 2001, a period of 
reasonable lending standards. This tight credit has resulted in more than one 
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million fewer housing purchase loans per year than would have been origi-
nated if standards had been less tight. 
This tight credit availability stems from lenders imposing overlays as a 
reaction to rep and warrant risk, litigation risk (particularly under the False 
Claims Act), and the high cost and uncertainty associated with servicing 
delinquent loans. Although the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) have completed their new 
rep and warrant framework, and lowered the costs associated with delin-
quent servicing, much work remains to be done at the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration (FHA). This is especially important because the FHA is the 
more economical provider of high loan-to-value (LTV) loans, particularly to 
borrowers with lower credit scores. 
The consequences of tight mortgage credit will grow over time. The 
overwhelming majority of new homeowners going forward are expected to 
be Hispanic or nonwhite, groups that have lower credit scores, less wealth, 
and lower incomes than their non-Hispanic white counterparts. In addition, 
homeownership is the traditional way that households build wealth. Chok-
ing off this important wealth-building channel will likely contribute to 
growing economic inequality. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 (continued). 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 8. 
  
Table 2. 
Settlements 
Firm Settlement Date Amount  
Citi Feb-12 $158.3 mil 
Flagstar Bank Feb-12 $132.8 mil 
Bank of America 
February 2012 (NMS), 
August 2014 (broader 
settlement) 
$1 bil (NMS), $1.85 bil 
(broader settlement) 
DB/Mortgage IT May-12 $202.3 mil 
Chase Feb-14 $614 mil 
US Bank Jun-14 $200 mil 
SunTrust Sep-14 $418 mil 
MetLife Feb-15 $123.5 mil 
First Horizon/First Ten-
nessee 
Jun-15 $212.5 mil 
Walter Investment Man-
agement Corp 
Sep-15 $29.6 mil 
Wells Fargo Apr-16 $1.2 bil 
Freedom  Mortgage  Apr-16 $113 mil 
M&T Bank May-16 $64 mil 
Regions Bank, Oct-16 $52.4 million 
Branch Banking and Trust 
(BB&T) 
Oct-16 $83 million 
Primary Residential 
Mortgage 
 Oct-16 $5.0 million 
Security National Mort-
gage Co. 
Oct-16 $4.25 million 
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Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 10. 
 
Aug: Introduced the Supplemental Performance 
Metric, to mitigate the adverse effects of the Compare 
Ratio on lenders who serve higher risk borrowers.
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